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This  paper  discusses  the  potential  role 
that  SWFs  could  play  in  African 
economies,  both  as  recipient  countries 
and  home  countries.  We  use  new  hand 
collected data to document the landscape 
of  African  SWFs  as  well  as  SWFs 
interventions  on  the  continent.  Our 
analysis  shows  that  African  SWFs  are 
small,  suffer  from  poor  governance 
structures  and  are  mainly  focusing  on 
stabilizing local economies. This suggests 
that  their  potential  role  as  long  term 
institutional investors to foster economic 
growth  is  likely  to  be  limited  if  current 
practices  are  maintained.  Conversely, 
foreign SWFs are increasingly interested 
in Africa and are poised to play a bigger 
role in supporting the continent’s growth 
if  Africa  uses  the  right  strategies  to 
attract their resources. Overall, the paper 
identifies opportunities that Africa offers 
for SWFs as well as challenges that need 
to be addressed in order to enhance SWFs 
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Africa’s Quest for Development: Can Sovereign Wealth Funds help? 
 
“At a time when people are fearful of Sovereign  
Wealth funds, I’m saying let’s look at this as an opportunity”, R. Zoellick, World Bank, 2008 
 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have emerged as potential solutions to actively manage 
foreign reserves accumulated from commodity sales or strong exports. They correspond 
to  government-owned  investment  vehicles  managed  by  a  state-controlled  entity  or 
external  managers,  on  behalf  of  a  nation,  to  serve  primarily  medium  to  long  term 
economic and financial objectives. Their existence could be traced back to the 1950’s 
when  Kuwait  established  in  1953  a  SWF  to  manage  its  foreign  reserves.  Impressive 
growth in the size of SWFs assets and the recent eye-popping cash infusions they made 
into high profile Western financial institutions like Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, UBS and 
the Blackstone group, to mitigate the negative effects of the financial crisis, helped spur 
the phenomenal increase in their popularity. Latest statistics published by Preqin show 
that SWFs managed USD 4 trillion in assets as of December 2010, 11% more than in 
2009, reflecting the start of a global economic recovery.
1 OECD expects assets under 
SWFs management to reach USD 10 trillion by 2015. Figure 1 depicts the strong positive 
association between the value of total assets managed by SWFs and commodities prices 
over the period 1999-2009. Preqin (2010) estimates that exports of hydrocarbon and other 
commodities provide respectively 60% and 8% of resources managed by SWFs. 
 
Significant revenues from commodities over the last decades had led to the inception of a 
number of SWFs in Africa, notably in oil exporting countries (e.g., Libya, Nigeria, and 
Chad). Botswana (Pula Fund) and Ghana (Minerals Development Fund) pioneered the 
establishment of African SWFs in 1993. According to our research, the continent counts 
at least 15 SWFs (Appendix A1). With the notable exceptions of the Libyan Investment 
Authority (LIA) and the Algerian Fonds de Regularisation des Recettes (FRR), which 
rank among the largest 15 SWFs worldwide in terms of size, African funds are dwarfed 
by their peers from other regions of the world (mainly Asia and the Middle East).  
 
                                                 
1 By the end of 2009, SWFs were reported to manage 1.72% of World financial assets, twice the value of 
assets managed by hedge funds. 6 
 






Source:  Authors’ calculation using Monitor Group SWF 2009 annual report, International Financial 
Statistics published by the IMF and Dow Jones Official Website. The line with triangles describes return 
on the Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Index (DJUBSTR). 
 
SWFs are often created either to stabilize government fiscal and/or foreign exchange 
revenues and macroeconomic aggregates by smoothing out fluctuations in export prices 
and demand, or to save for future generations a fraction of the revenues accruing from the 
sale  of  non-renewable  natural  resources.  There  is  considerable  controversy  about  the 
relative merits of SWFs and their value added. Proponents of SWFs argue that these 
funds can help foster economic growth and prosperity for current and future generations 
by showcasing successful experiences such as Norway. They also point out that these 
vehicles can help stabilize the global financial system by providing cross-border liquidity 
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concerns that SWFs would endow governments with too much power, which could move 
the global economy away from liberalism and impede market forces and competition. A 
second reservation concerns the possibility that SWFs may threaten national security in 
recipient countries if investments are made for strategic or political rather than economic 
purposes.  Such  a  scenario  would  trigger  a  protectionist  backlash  that  could  have 
disastrous effects on the world economy. 
 
Where does Africa stand in this debate? To what extent, if at all, SWFs can benefit 
African  economies?  Can  the  controversy  discussed  above  be  resolved  in  the  case  of 
Africa? Unfortunately, the literature does not provide clear answers to these questions, as 
research  about  SWFs  potential  support  to  Africa’s  development  is  rather  scant.  This 
largely  reflects  the  strong  opacity  surrounding  SWFs  existence,  holdings,  and 
institutional arrangements.  
 
The objective of this paper is to improve understanding of SWFs activities in Africa and 
to discuss the potential role that SWFs could play in African economies, both as recipient 
countries and home countries. The remainder of the paper is structured as follow. Section 
1  draws  a  detailed  portrait  of  African  SWFs,  providing  what  we  believe  is  the  first 
comprehensive  list  of  those  funds,  putting  them  in  perspective,  and  describing  their 
characteristics and activities. Section 2 describes the interventions of foreign SWFs in 
Africa while section 3 discusses the potential benefits of SWFs for African states given 
the socio-economic context of those economies. Section 4 discusses issues that may arise 
from  SWFs  operations  in  Africa.  Section  5  concludes  by  providing  some 
recommendations. 
 
The paper makes several contributions to the debate on the role that institutional investors 
are poised to play in global capital markets. First, it analyzes how African economies can 
benefit from SWFs and use them as a channel to tap into international financial markets. 
Second, the paper documents the size of assets managed by SWFs and describes how and 
to  what  extent  they  can  contribute  into  broadening  and  deepening  African  financial 
systems.  This includes discussions on their capacity to mobilize sizeable amount of long-
term  financing  and  to  diversify  African  financial  systems  out  of  the  banking  sector, 
through investments in a various set of non-bank financial assets (equity, fixed income 
securities,  real  estate,  etc.)  and  institutions  (insurance,  leasing  companies  and  private 
equity funds). Last but not least, the paper examines the very important role that SWFs 
could play to stabilize the global financial system, through large injections of funds into 
the  global  economy.  This  is  documented  with  reference  to  investments  made  by  the 
Libyan  Investment  Authority  (LIA)  in  some  European  (e.g.  Italy,  United  Kingdom, 
Netherland-Belgium and Spain) financial institutions to prevent some of the deleterious 
effects of the recent global financial crisis.   
   8 
 
1.  What do African SWFs look like? 
 
According to our research, Africa counts 15 SWFs (Appendix A1). Among the five (5) 
largest African SWFs, four (4) are sourced from oil and gas revenues, the last being 
sourced  from  diamonds,  minerals  and  other  natural  resources.  These  funds  were 
established on a voluntary basis, with the notable exception of Chad’s Future generation 
fund which resulted from the World Bank requirement to establish a petroleum revenue 
management law in Chad as a condition to disburse a loan aimed at funding the Duba oil 
fields  and  the  Chad-Cameroon  pipeline.  Strong  opacity  surrounding  their  existence, 
holdings and institutional arrangements makes tracking of African SWFs a challenging 
task.  A  plausible  explanation  for  this  limited  attention  is  the  relatively  small  size  of 
African SWFs compared to their counterparts from other regions of the world as well as 
their passive management strategies. 
 
African SWFs motives 
 
It  comes  out  fairly  clearly  from  Appendix  A1  that  African  SWFs  are  predominantly 
driven by stabilization motives and to a lesser extent by the need to  generate higher 
returns on domestic resources in order to accumulate wealth for future generations. For 
most  African  countries,  stabilization  needs  are  twofold.  On  the  short  term,  African 
countries need to smooth their expenditures in a context of volatile commodity prices to 
avoid challenges in macroeconomic planning resulting from revenue instability (Asfaha, 
2007). On the long term, African countries need to protect themselves against decline in 
revenues resulting from depletion of non-renewable resources. Moreover, non-renewable 
commodities are often the single most important source of foreign currency revenues in 
these countries which makes them haunted by the paradox of plenty or the so called 
resource  curse.  Auty  (1993)  first  introduced  this  term  to  describe  the  potential 
devastating effects that natural resources could have on economic growth in developing 
countries, therefore transforming natural resources from a desirable asset to a curse. The 
resource curse thesis is based on observations that countries richly endowed with natural 
resources tend to have lower rates of economic growth and development than countries 
with fewer natural resources. The resource curse can originate from different sources, 
including government mismanagement of revenues arising from these resources, weak 
governance or the Dutch Disease.
2 
 
As shown in Appendix A1, African SWFs are commodity-based and derive their funding 
from  commodity  sales.  This  makes  them  useful  to  absorb  large  foreign  exchanges 
surpluses  and  avoid  inflationary  pressures  as  well  as  the  need  for  sterilization 
interventions which can be costly for African countries with prevailing high interest rates. 
In theory, foreign reserves accumulation through SWFs represents also a “self insurance” 
                                                 
2The term Dutch Disease was first used by the Economist during the late 70’s to describe a contraction of 
the  manufacturing  sector  in  the  Netherlands  resulting  from  a  surge  in  revenues  from  natural  gas 
discoveries. It describes a severe decline and loss of competitiveness of the non-commodity sectors (mainly 
manufacturing)  resulting  from  an  appreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate  as  revenues  from  the  natural 
resource sector enter the economy.  9 
 
against  capital  flight  that  should  favor  autonomy  in  macroeconomic  policy  (Griffith-
Jones and Ocampo, 2010).  
  
Available information suggests that African SWFs have been subject to regular capital 
withdrawals to balance governments’ budgets and repay external debt. For instance, the 
balance of Nigeria Excess Crude Account (ECA) decreased from USD 20 billion in 2008 
to  less  than  USD  3  billion  in  2010  while  Sudan  almost  wiped  out  its  Oil  Revenue 
Stabilization Fund (ORSF) (Medani, 2010). Similarly, Algeria has been using its Fonds 
de Regularisation des Recettes (FRR) to repay public debt and fund fiscal deficits while 
Mauritania  withdrew  USD  45  million  from  its  Fonds  National  des  Revenus  des 
Hydrocarbures leaving a balance of USD 34.25 million as of march 2009.
3 
 
Such statistics suggest that African governments kept spending while also accumulating 
resources in their stabilization funds, which  may have potentially resulted in zero net 
savings. This raises concerns about intergenerational equity and long term fiscal and 
macroeconomic sustainability, especially in a context of external negative shocks. With 
few notable exceptions, most African co untries have no limitations on the amount that 
could be used to close budget deficits from commodity -based revenues. Such features 
have been identified by Asafah (2007) as common design problems in SWFs.  Yet, one 
might  argue  that  reducing  external  debt  de creases  the  financial  burden  on  future 
generations which is only true if the reduction in debt is permanent and leads to improved 
economic growth. In the African context, this still needs to be proved. 
 
African SWFs size 
 
The regional distribution of SWFs (Fig. 2) displays a predominance of the Middle East 
(43%) followed by Asia (36%), and Europe (18%).
4 Africa-based SWFs have a market 
share that presumably does not exceed 2%. As of December 2009, African SWFs had 
USD 114.27 billion in assets under manageme nt, much less than their  peers from the 
Middle East, which held assets amounting to USD 1.41trillion. Interestingly, African 
SWFs  have  experienced  a  surge  from  2008  to  2009  despite  decreasing  oil  prices. 
Potential explanations for this growth include an in crease in the volume of commodity 
exports, a raise in the share of foreign reserves received by SWFs, or the establishment of 
new SWFs on the continent.  
 
While statistics describing total assets under SWFs management are publicly available, 
very  little  in formation  exists  on  their  individual  characteristics.  According  to  our 
estimates, Africa counts 15 SWFs (Appendix A1), the Libyan Investment Authority 
(LIA) being the largest with assets amounting to USD 70 billion. Additional SWFs will 
                                                 
3 http://www.fr.for-mauritania.org/1373-0-Exclusif-For-Mauritania-publie-des-documents-confidentiels-
sur-le-pillage-du-Fond-National-des-Revenus-des-Hydrocrabures-par-la-Junte.html 
4 According to the Sovereign Wealth Institute, there are currently 53 SWFs operating worldwide. In terms 
of market share, China, United Arab Emirates and Norway come out as the major centers, accounting for 
24%, 18% and 12% of the global mark et, respectively (IFSL, 2010). The three largest SWFs in terms of 
asset size are commodity-based and are the following in importance order: The Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority from the UAE, the Government Pension Fund from Norway, and the SAMA Foreign Holdi ngs 
from Saudi Arabia.  10 
 
presumably  be  launched  in  African  countries  including  Zimbabwe  and  Mauritius.
5 
Similarly, several countries which have already stabilization funds are now considering 
the  establishment  of  SWF s  with  savings  and  development  mandates.  For  instance, 
Nigeria, which established in 2004 the ECA to insulate the Nigerian economy from boom 
and bust cycles in commodity prices, is expected to launch soon the Nigeria Posterity 
Fund  to  stabilize  macroeconomic  fundamentals,  accumulate  savings  for  future 
generations and develop critical infr astructure. Thus, the growing number of African 
funds is likely to increase the share of African SWFs in global SWF assets.  
 
Fig.2: SWFs’ Assets under management by region 
 
Source:  International Financial Services London Research (2009), SWF Institute 
Website, Authors calculations 
African SWFs governance structures 
 
So  far,  public  disclosure  about  assets,  strategies,  rationales,  and  structure  of  African 
SWFs remains extremely heterogeneous and scarce. This makes governance a main issue 
to be addressed for African SWFs. Governance encompasses institutional arrangements 
to  report  on  investments  composition  and  performance,  and  accountability  and 
transparency  measures  to  ensure  prudent  management  of  sovereign  resources  and 
independent decision making. Table 1 documents the low level of transparency of SWFs 
as measured by the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index.
6 Moreover, as can be seen 
from Table 1, out of the 15 African SWFs we were able to identify, only 3 (from Libya, 
                                                 
5 http://oxfordswfproject.com/2010/11/19/field-work-in-mauritius-please/ and 
http://oxfordswfproject.com/?s=zimbabwe 


























Botswana and Equatorial  Guinea) have  signed the Santiago Principles.
7  Nevertheless, 
African signatory countries barely disclose information about their SWFs activities or 
structure.  The  transparency  of  each  fund is  usually  related  to  the openness  of  the 
country’s  political  system.  Thus,  setting  up  corruption-free  SWFs  in  several  African 
countries, known to have opaque political regimes, is very challenging.   
 
Governance  problems  in  African  SWFs  may  arise  from  lack  of  institutional 
arrangements. For example, Nigerian finance minister recently announced that the ECA 
is not backed by a law and that “the process of accessing the ECA is not as transparent 
and clear to the Nigerian people, therefore there is a general perception that there is 
some  level  of  mismanagement”.
  8Governance  issues  may  also  arise  from  poor 
enforceability of existing institutional arrangements. For instance, Chad amended in 2005 
its national revenue management law in order to increase the share of oil revenues that 
goes  into  the  budget  revenue  from  15  to  30%.  Later  it  included  defense  in  the 
discretionary expenses and canceled the fund for future generation (Asfaha, 2007). This 
type of behavior casts doubt about the quality of governance in African SWFs. 
 
Table1: Transparency status of African SWFs (2010) 
SWF name  Country  Santiago 
Principles 
Signatory




Fonds de Régulation des Recettes   Algeria  No  1 
Reserve Fund for Oil  Angola   No  NA  
Pula Fund   Botswana   Yes  3 
Fund for Future Generations   Chad   No  NA 
Fonds de Stabilisation des Recettes Budgétaires  Congo  No  NA 
Fund for Future Generations   Equatorial Guinea   Yes  NA 
Fonds de Stabilisation des Recettes Budgétaires  Equatorial Guinea  No  NA 
Fund for Future Generations   Gabon   No  NA 
Minerals Development Fund  Ghana   No  NA 
Libyan Investment Authority  Libya   Yes  2 
Fonds National des Revenus des Hydrocarbures   Mauritania   No  1 
Minerals Development Fund  Namibia   No  NA 
Excess Crude Account  Nigeria   No  1 
National Oil Account   São Tomé and Principe  No  NA 
Oil Revenue Stabilization Fund   Sudan   No  NA 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation using data from the Monitor Group, SWF Institute. Unfortunately, the 
value of this index is not available for African SWFs that were not previously identified in the literature. 
African SWFs investments 
                                                 
7 The Santiago principles were launched in October 2008 by the International Working Group of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds (IWG) in a joint effort with the IMF to foster trust, openness, transparency and probity in the 
management of SWFs. They are expected to preserve domestic SWFs and support further investments by 





Unfortunately,  it  is  very  difficult  to  find  accurate  information  about  how  and  where 
African SWFs invest their resources. Available data suggest that African SWFs have 
been adopting prudent  investment  strategies  with  an emphasis  on liquidity, reflecting 
mainly their stabilization mandates. For example, a recent IMF report shows that Nigeria’ 
ECA is mainly invested in short-term, liquid government securities and money market 
instruments while research published by JPMorgan (2008) shows that the Pula fund has 
invested 59% of its assets in bonds and 13% in cash and restricts its investments to rated 
assets.
 African SWFs are also actively investing outside Africa. Asfaha (2007) reports 
that Chad invest its proceeds from natural resources sales abroad while Sao Tome and 
Principe oil revenue management law prohibits investments in companies controlled by 
locals (Albin et al. 2004). Similarly, Belaicha et al. (2009) estimate that half of Algeria 
foreign currency reserves have been invested in US sovereign bonds and deposits and 
tier-one banks. Hence, African SWFs are mainly seeking “safe investments” in stable 
economies leaving limited resources for their local economies, and even less for their 
neighboring countries. 
 
The  Libyan  Investment  Authority  (LIA)  remains  the  only  African  SWF  that  has  a 
relatively active and aggressive investment strategy. LIA was created in December 2006 
by a decree of the Comité Populaire Général, with the purpose of consolidating existing 
investment vehicles, namely the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company, the Libyan 
African Investment Portfolio (LAP), the Long-Term Investment Portfolio and the Oil 
Investment  Company,  which  have  become  subsidiaries.  Appendix  A3  provides  a 
description  of  LIA’s  main  subsidiaries.  Most  of  LIA’s  investments  in  Africa  are 
undertaken  by  the  Libyan  African  Investment  Portfolio.  Its  subsidiary,  the  Libyan 
African Investment Company (LAICO) has presence in 30 African countries. We were 
able to track 114 investments made by LIA over the last 3 decades, out of which 24 are 
located outside Africa.  While this sample describes only part of LIA’s activities, it still 
provides insightful information about the region and sector distribution of its investments. 
Figure 3 shows that West Africa is the main target of LIA investments, followed by East 
and Central Africa while North Africa and Southern Africa rank at the bottom. However, 
the value clustering shows a different picture with North Africa capturing USD 9 billion, 
the highest share of investments. This probably reflects the stable and business friendly 
environment offered by North African countries compared to Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
sector distribution of LIA investments in Africa shows a large number of small scale 
deals in the real estate, hotels and restaurants, and agriculture sectors as well as a small 
number of large deals in Infrastructure and oil and gas sectors.  LIA deals outside Africa 
targeted  mainly  companies  from  Italy  and  the  United  Kingdom.  Oil  and  gas  and 
manufacturing captured the largest number of these investments while the financial sector 
benefited from the highest share of deal values.  
   13 
 
Fig.3: Regional distribution of selected LIA investments 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
 
African SWFs reputation  
Cash infusions made by Africa-based SWFs have not always been greeted with alloyed 
gratitude. A 2010 survey conducted by Hill & Knowlton and Penn Schoen Berland on 
national officials’ attitudes towards SWFs shows that African SWFs in Libya, Algeria 
and  Nigeria  were  ranked  less  favorably  than  their  Middle  Eastern  peers  (Fig.  4). 
According to this survey, even African host countries like Egypt share this view.  
Given  that  some  of  these  funds  do  not  invest  abroad.  the  negative  perception  likely 
reflects the negative image of African countries rather than wrong doing by these funds . 
This is corroborated by the results of the above mentioned survey which shows that home 
country reputation is a major determinant of the image, transparency and governance 
structure of a SWF. It should also be noted that most of the non-African SWFs that 
received better ranking do not necessarily disclose more information about their asset 
allocation or returns than African funds.  
 
Prominent  concerns  that  were  expressed  by  recipient  countries  include  fear  from  the 
increased role of the states in financial and economic systems, and the possibility that 







Number of investments 14 
 
some African SWFs’ may pursue “non commercial” objectives. Such concerns led the 
Pentagon to cancel in 1986 a USD 7.9 million contract between the US marine and Fiat 
because of the LIA shareholding in the company.
9 Africa remains also portrayed by the 
mass media as a charity case suffering from political violence, corruption and famine. 
This cast doubts about the capacity of African SWFs to have value added as investors and 
the potential negative effects that  their presence could have on the transparency and 
governance structure of beneficiary investees.   
 
This negative perception most likely translates into additional barriers to African SWFs 
activities. Recent turmoil in Libya and allegations about control o f LIA resources by 
political elite are likely to further cast doubts about the legitimacy of African SWFs and 
showcase the importance of strong governance structures. Nonetheless, the negative 
perception does not mean that Africa’s SWFs money is not welcome in other regions of 
the world. Headlines from the business press have reported investments by LIA in some 
European (e.g. Italy and Spain) financial institutions to prevent some of the deleterious 
effects of the crisis despite allegations about LIA weak governance.  In July, 2008, LIA 
bought a share in the Dutch-Belgian bank of Fortis, which needed additional funds to 
maintain solvability. More recently, the LIA drew public attention when it backed a new 
London hedge fund (FM Capital Partners) with hundreds of millions of dollars.  
 
Fig.4: Extent of SWFs investment approval by home country 
 
Source: Sovereign brands survey 2010. The figure summarizes responses to the question: to what extent 
do  you  approve  or  disapprove  of  SWFs  from  the  following  countries  investing  in  your  country? 
(Strongly/somewhat disapprove). 













































2. What are foreign SWFs doing in Africa? 
African countries  made headlines in  the business  press  as  targets  for investments  by 
SWFs.  Some  governments  are  even  creating  development  funds  (China  –Africa 
development Funds) or Investment companies (Dubai World Africa) entirely dedicated to 
Africa.  These  vehicles  are  designed  to  take  advantage  of  the  substantial  and  diverse 
opportunities  the  continent  is  offering  given  its  900  million  young  population,  its 
emerging economies and growing middle-income class. The continent natural resources 
remain also untapped, offering a wealth of opportunities for commodity investors. In a 
2008  speech,  the  World  Bank  president,  Robert  Zoellick,  called  on  SWFs  from  the 
Middle East and Asia to Invest 1 percent of their assets in Africa. This could potentially 
channel up to USD 29.7 billion in foreign investment for Africa, almost one third of 
Africa’s needs for infrastructure funding. 
Nevertheless, Africa’s share in foreign SWFs investments remains negligible. According 
to  recent  research published by  IFLS (IFLS, 2010), Africa  attracted  less  than 5% of 
SWFs resources. For example, as of December 2009, out of 8,300 companies in which 
the  Norway  SWF  held  equity  investments,  only  144  (corresponding  to  1.74%)  were 
Africans. These companies are concentrated in 3 countries, namely South Africa (104 
companies), Egypt (32 companies) and Morocco (8 companies). Tracking investments 
made by foreign SWFs in Africa is challenging given the limited public disclosure. We 
were  able  to  track  a  sample  of  69  direct  investments  undertaken  by  foreign  SWFs, 
including 17 investments made by the China-Africa Investment Fund.  This sample is by 
no means exhaustive. Nonetheless, it provides useful information and stylized facts on 
the sector and regional allocation of foreign SWFs’ investments.  
Fig.5: Sector and regional distribution of selected foreign SWFs direct investments 
in Africa 
  
Source: Authors’ calculation 








Real Estate, Hotels and Hospitality
Number of investments  Sub Saharan Africa North Africa16 
 
Figure 5 shows that real estate and hospitality sectors attracted the largest number of 
deals on the continent while North Africa attracted a smaller number of deals than sub-
Saharan  Africa.  Interestingly,  while  North  Africa  attracted  deals  in  the  banking  and 
financial sector, foreign SWFs invested in the industrial sector and extractive industries 
in sub-Saharan Africa. Conversely, the value clustering shows that North Africa received 
a  larger  share  of  foreign  SWFs  resources,  mainly  to  fund  large  real  estate  and 
infrastructure projects. 
 
3.  What are the benefits of SWFs for African economies? 
 
The landscape of African SWFs drawn earlier suggests that African SWFs are relatively 
small compared to their peers from other regions like the Middle East or Asia. They also 
suffer from governance and reputation problems that limit their ability to invest outside 
their home countries and to achieve good financial performance. Given their cyclical role, 
most African SWFs (which have a stabilization purpose) have also limited capacity to 
invest in long term illiquid assets. Thus, one might argue that African SWFs have very 
limited value added for African economies that is linked to short term stabilization.  
 
However, home grown SWFs can be beneficial for African nations if they are used and 
structured properly in order to take advantage of their full potential. This implies that 
African SWFs, at least most of them, would have to go beyond their stabilization and 
macroeconomic stability motives to position themselves as instruments geared towards 
achieving economic growth, intergenerational resource transfers, infrastructure financing, 
financial  sector  stabilization,  deepening  and  broadening,  and  regional  integration. 
Similarly, we also believe that foreign SWFs can provide a sizeable source of FDIs to 
African  countries  which  should  lead  to  human  and  physical  capital  formation  and 
ultimately  growth  (Rios-Morales  and  Brennan,  2009).  The  benefits  of  creating  or 
attracting  SWFs  in  Africa  can  be  appreciated  from  many  different  perspectives  as 
discussed below.  
 
SWFs  as  instruments  to  maximize  investments’  risk-adjusted  returns  and  accumulate 
resources for future generations.  Unlike reserves management by central banks which is 
usually limited to investments in US and European sovereign fixed income securities, 
SWFs’ holdings are more diversified and could be structured to maximize risk-adjusted 
returns  that  are  not  necessarily  pegged  to  the  dollar  value.  A  business  week  article 
published in 2008, indicated that the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority has returned about 
10%  a  year  since  its  inception,
10  while  the  2009  annual  report  for  the  Norway 
Government pension fund  reported an impressive 25.6 percent in return during 2009. 
These rates exceed by far any return that African central banks could potentially earn 
from fixed income securities. Given Africa’s demographics and important financing gaps 
observed  in  almost  all sectors,  accumulating  resources  is  very  important  to  meet  the 
increasing needs that may arise from existing and future generations.    
 




SWFs as channels for economic diversification and development. SWFs could be useful 
in supporting economic diversification given that they often invest in a wide range of 
asset  classes.  They  also  have  long  term  investment  horizons  and  exhibit  higher  risk 
tolerance than central banks in managing foreign currency reserves. Thus, Africa-based 
SWFs  can  play  an  important  role  in  supporting  their  local  economies  by  directly 
providing capital, or by encouraging their international investees to invest in African 
companies. Countries like China and Saudi Arabia have been successful in supporting 
their  economies  by  using  their  SWFs.  According  to  Monitor  (2008),  26%  of  SWFs 
reported  investments  were  made  in  home  countries.  The  share  of  SWFs  resources 
dedicated to local investments should result from a tradeoff between the local economic 
needs and the amount of foreign assets required to ensure macroeconomic stability and 
revenue diversification.  
 
African SWFs’ investments can also be made strategically to secure inputs needed in 
local economies. For example, in 2007, the Abu Dhabi Mubadala took an 8.3% stake in 
Guinea Alumina Corporation, a USD 3 billion joint venture aimed at transforming the 
bauxite of Guinea into alumina. This venture will provide the alumina plant that the 
government of Abu Dhabi is planning to set up with, a life-long access to cost-effective 
alumina.  African SWFs can facilitate technology transfer to African industries through 
their investments in multinationals as well, and by encouraging these companies to set up 
Research and Development (R&D) facilities in Africa. Balin (2008) argues that SWFs 
can play an active role in shaping up patent laws for technologies created from these 
R&D facilities to favor dissemination to domestic firms.  
 
Similarly, foreign SWFs resources could be channeled to Africa to develop new sectors 
or supporting existing ones.  This could have striking effects on the amount of direct 
investment received by African recipient economies. Africa’s performance during the last 
decade shows that the continent has favorable investment prospects which fit well with 
the long-term, high-return perspective of SWFs. Since, foreign SWFs are looking for 
good investment opportunities in new emerging markets, this can turn out to be good 
news for Africa.  
 
SWFs as channels to bridge the infrastructure financing gap.  According to estimates 
from  Infrastructure  Consortium  for  Africa,  a  little  under  USD  93  billion  of  annual 
investments  are  required  to  address  Africa’s  infrastructure  needs,  about  one  third  of 
which is to upkeep existing networks. Infrastructure encompasses energy plants, roads, 
ports,  water  and  sanitation  facilities  but  also  information  and  telecommunication 
networks. As Africa grows at 5% per year, one can expect additional demand for more 
reliable and efficient infrastructure to emerge. So far, Africa’s infrastructure has been 
mainly funded by local governments with donors’ support and to a limited extent by 
private investors. 
 
According  to  Preqin  (2011)  the  proportion  of  SWFs  investing  in  infrastructure  has 
increased from 47% in 2010 to 61% at the beginning of this year. This suggests that 
SWFs could play a bigger role to bolster infrastructure investments in Africa. Such long 
term high-yielding investments meet the time and risk profile of SWFs needs (OECD, 18 
 
2008). First, given the monopolistic structure of many infrastructure projects in Africa, 
the demand for the asset tends to be inelastic and price adjustments for inflation are 
unlikely  to  be  affected  (JPMorgan,  2007).  Hence,  infrastructure  investments  could 
provide a hedge against inflation. Second, infrastructure projects offer long term cash 
flow streams which aligns appropriately with the investment time horizon of SWFs. As a 
matter of fact, revenues from infrastructure projects are mainly generated through income 
rather than investment appreciation, which should provide more predictable, and reliable 
long-term  cash  flow  streams  and  returns  (JPMorgan,  2007).  Besides,  infrastructure 
projects  historically  delivered  high  returns  (see  Table  2)  with  low  correlations  with 
traditional asset classes thus serving as a risk reduction tool. Third, the scarcity of long 
term finance on the continent and the low liquidity of African financial markets offer 
SWFs a good opportunity to negotiate attractive terms on their long term funding in 
Africa.  
 
Table 2: Risk and return performance of infrastructure projects in % 














Macquarie Global Infrastructure  32.28  10.23  30.80  8.78  28.50  9.23 
Macquarie USA Infrastructure  21.05  11.05  19.68  9.75  21.48  9.98 
Russell 3000  14.53  8.12  15.45  7.41  13.81  8.02 
MSCI World ex US  26.33  7.95  26.90  8.75  24.02  9.67 
Lehman Aggregate  5.38  2.62  5.29  2.48  3.88  2.78 
 
Source: JPMorgan (2007) 
 
SWFs as  channels  for  regional integration. African SWFs  could  place some of their 
resources in banks throughout the continent to shore up their long term deposits. Given 
the long time investment horizon of SWFs, this should help address the scarcity of long 
term resources at the continent level. The LIA has been actively investing in hotels in 
Africa  through  LAICO  (Libyan  African  Investment  Company).  Most  of  these 
acquisitions correspond to 3 to 5 star hotels and are managed by international operators. 
In  2008,  LAICO  established  a  joint  venture,  called  LAICO  Hotels  Management 
Company,  with  Tunisia  Travel  Service  (TTS),  a  Tunisian  company  involved  in  the 
hospitality sector through hotels management, airlines and ground transportation. This 
illustrates how an African SWF could develop business within Africa while leveraging on 
another African country expertise. Given the relatively small size of most African SWFs, 
the latter could pool part of their resources to create regional development banks or a 
fund of funds that will significantly scale up their individual financing capacities. This 
would foster regional financial cooperation (Griffith and Ocampo, 2010).  
 
SWFs as stabilizing instruments for financial systems. Given their long term investment 
horizon and low leverage, SWFs can have a stabilizing effect on African financial market 
volatility, especially during periods of financial turmoil. As indicated by Monitor (2009) 
SWFs have been instrumental in stabilizing the global financial system during the recent 
financial crisis while providing a total of USD 128 billion into the global economy to the 
substantial benefit of European and American financial institutions (USD 57.9 billion). 19 
 
African SWFs have contributed to stabilizing the global financial system as well. This 
can be seen through the interventions of the LIA to help dampen the deleterious effects of 
the crisis faced by some European (e.g. Italy and Spain) financial institutions.  It has been 
reported  that  in  July,  2008,  the  LIA  rescued  Dutch-Belgian  bank  of  Fortis,  while 
acquiring some shares, to ensure its solvability.  
 
Similarly, a large number of African financial institutions-especially non banks- are not 
adequately  capitalized.  Foreign  and African SWFs  can strengthen the capital  base of 
these financial institutions which should ensure the continuation and expansion of their 
activities. As institutional investors, SWFs can also provide comfort to other investors 
and help improve governance and business structures of Africa’s financial institutions. 
Ultimately,  this  should  lead  to  a  more  resilient  financial  system.  In  the  wake  of  the 
financial crisis, China and Algeria resorted to their SWFs’ assets to recapitalize their 
domestic banks, which is a clear example of SWFs as means to stabilize the financial 
system.  
SWFs as channels for enhancing financial systems’ depth and breadth. In the wake of the 
financial turmoil, SWFs are worried that dollar-denominated assets are no longer reliable 
stores of value. This leaves African financial markets with a window of opportunity to 
attract these investors especially that African markets have been performing quite well. 
On average, SWFs allocate 35 to 49% of their resources to fixed income securities, 50 to 
55%  to  listed  corporations  and  the  remaining  to  alternative  investments  (real  estate, 
private equity, etc.) (OECD, 2008). Using this asset allocation and a 5% share for Africa 
in SWFs portfolio, SWFs could invest up to USD 125 billion in African listed stocks, 
almost two third of the combined 2009 market capitalization of the Lusaka, Nairobi, 
Botswana, Nigeria and Egypt stock exchanges
11.  
SWFs can also enhance financial systems breadth by supporting non -bank financial 
institutions such as insurance and leasing companies and private equity funds. This will 
diversify financial systems in most African countries which are currently mainly bank -
concentrated. For instance, the Norway government pension fund relies on 9 external 
fund management companies in South Africa.  
 
4.  What are the challenges facing SWFs operations in Africa? 
 
SWFs  offer  several  benefits  that  were  discussed  earlier.  Yet,  their  establishment  and 
management in the African context could entail the following issues. 
 
Lack of coordination with fiscal and monetary policies. In theory, SWFs are no different 
from any other fiscal resources at the disposal of a given government, and as such their 
establishment and management need to be carefully coordinated with monetary policy in 
the  originating  countries.  In  several  African  countries  where  inflation  is  an  issue,  a 
sudden increase in liquidity resulting from repatriation of returns on foreign assets can 
lead to unwanted inflationary pressure, which would force the monetary authority to raise 
interest rates above desired levels, thus slowing the economy and reducing growth. In 
                                                 
11 Based on information available on the website of the African Stock Exchanges Association 20 
 
countries with a fixed exchange rate regime, such an inflow of liquidity would lead to an 
undesired change in the stock of foreign reserves in order to sustain the peg. 
 
SWFs  home  countries  also  face  the  fundamental  and  longstanding  issue  of  how  to 
allocate their resources  between SWFs  and public spending on education, health and 
infrastructure. In African countries, where a non-negligible fraction of the population is 
plagued by poverty, hunger and health problems, such a tradeoff is even more complex to 
resolve.  Finally,  in  countries  where  SWFs  are  funded  via  taxation  of  non-renewable 
resources, the government ought to maintain the tax rates at levels that do not hamper 
economic activity. Furthermore, while SWFs could be used as a tool to support sound 
fiscal policies, they should not be viewed as a replacement solution to fiscal reforms (Le 
Borgne and Medas, 2007). 
 
Potential disruptive effects on markets. Potential destabilizing effects of foreign SWFs 
investments on recipient African countries can happen through three (3) channels. First, 
large investments in recipient assets might trigger speculation bubbles leading to higher 
market volatility in host countries. In fact, these flows are likely to affect the capital and 
financial  account,  and  relative  prices,  and  thus  may  affect  external  stability.  Strong 
opacity characterizing most SWFs prevents proper market expectation which is likely to 
amplify market volatility. Small African economies and those with nascent markets are 
more vulnerable. Moreover, African stock markets are often poorly regulated when it 
comes to insider trading and other market manipulation, and are therefore more prone to 
high volatility. Second, destabilization can result from SWFs involvement in the banking 
sector  with  SWFs  distorting  credit  allocation  process  to  favor  their  home  country 
businesses (Heyward, 2008).  Third, large reverse in SWFs flows resulting from profit 
repatriation  or  asset reallocations  involve also  currency transactions  that  might  affect 
African currencies. 
 
Protectionist behavior against FDIs. One corollary to the fact that SWFs are often seen 
as hostile vehicles is that recipient countries may implement protectionist regulation that 
adversely affects FDI flows. This is the case when SWFs are perceived as a threat to 
national  security  in  the  recipient  country.  For  instance,  the  Foreign  Investment  and 
National  Security  Act  enacted  in  the  US  in  2007  imposed  more  scrutiny  on  foreign 
investment made by sovereign entities. Several developed countries have also special 
agencies that oversee and regulate foreign investments including those done by SWFs 
(Committee on Foreign Investment in the US-CFIUS). African recipient countries may 
follow this tendency which could have negative consequences on their FDI inflows. For 
instance,  African  countries  that  have  been  implementing  privatization  strategies  may 
enact such regulation to reduce foreign states intervention and encourage private sector 
investments. To the best of our knowledge no African country implemented regulation 
that specifically limits foreign sovereign investments. Yet, this may come in the near 
future as these SWFs (especially China) become more active on the continent.  
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper discusses the potential role that SWFs could play in African economies, both 
as recipient countries and home countries. We first draw a landscape of African SWFs 
putting them in perspective, and describing their characteristics and investment activities 
in Africa. We also provide some insightful patterns about foreign SWFs activities on the 
continent.  
 
Our analysis suggests that African SWFs are small and mainly focusing on achieving 
stabilization objectives. They are also characterized by poor governance structures. Thus, 
their role as long term institutional investors in Africa is likely to be negligible if current 
practices are maintained. To fully benefit from their SWFs, there is a need for African 
economies to: 
 
  Clarify SWFs’  roles,  objectives  and responsibilities as  suggested by the fiscal 
transparency and reserve management guidelines established by the IMF. SWFs 
should have clear objectives. Lack of clarity about the expected outcomes from 
SWFs can lead to their failure. Home countries should also ensure that investment 
strategies are consistent with underlying objectives. 
 
  Carefully synchronize deposits and draw downs from commodity-based SWFs 
with  the  country’s  income  accruing  from  the  sale  of  nonrenewable  natural 
resources in order to ensure that revenues are set aside to stabilize the country’s 
fundamentals,  should  resources  be  exhausted.  For  instance,  countries  need  to 
establish limits on the contribution of commodity revenues to fiscal deficits and 
create “permanent endowment” that will serve long term savings objectives only.  
This endowment could be used to invest in relatively illiquid assets over a longer 
time  horizon  and  enhance  African  SWFs  participation  in  African  financial 
systems. 
 
  Implement strong corporate governance structures to make sure that resources are 
well managed and that SWFs’ investment strategies are supporting the country’s 
macroeconomic  policies  and  development  plans.  Obviously,  there  is  no  “one-
governance-structure-fits-all” solution given the plurality of legal forms adopted 
by African SWFs. Adequate risk management systems and human resources need 
also to be put in place to ensure accountability and transparency. Several African 
SWFs  are  managed  by  local  central  banks.  Countries  should  either  develop 
internally  required capacity to  implement  optimal investment  strategies  or use 
external managers 
 
Conversely, Foreign SWFs are expected to play a greater role in Africa. However, in 
order to better attract and benefit from foreign SWFs, African economies should: 
 
  Avoid overregulation of investable sectors/companies. African countries need to 
find  a  balance  between  protecting  themselves  and  offering  a  regulatory 
framework conducive to SWFs involvement in their economies. This does not 22 
 
mean that they should enact relaxed regulation that hinders their long term growth 
simply because they desperately need FDI. Relaxed FDI regulation could give 
foreign SWFs a high bargaining power to make acquisitions in strategic sectors 
and in some extent, to exert some pressure geared towards pushing the economic, 
financial and regulatory reforms agenda forward in the host African countries. A 
potential solution to limit SWFs influence on African economies would be to 
prohibit majority stakes for SWFs holdings or cancel their voting rights, should 
their stake exceed a threshold that needs to be determined. Another option would 
consist in requiring SWFs to publish a voting list on a regular basis. 
 
  Ensure a foreign-investor friendly business environment and strong protection of 
investors’ rights. 
 
  Make  sure  that  the  risk  of  SWFs  controlling  banks’  capital  can  be  mitigated 
through the implementation of safeguards to ensure that SWFs-controlled banks 




A1: Description of African SWFs 
 
SWF name  Country  Date of establishment  Funding 
Source 
Fund Type 








Fonds de Régulation des 
Recettes  
Algeria  2000
 a  Oil  Stabilization Fund  59.34  b  2009 
Fonds de Stabilisation des 
Recettes Budgétaires 
Chad  2006 c  Oil  Stabilization Fund  0.003  d  2010 
Reserve Fund for Oil  Angola  2004 e  Oil  Stabilization Fund  0.2  f  2008 
Pula Fund   Botswana  1994 g  Diamonds   Development fund  6.9  h  2010 
Fonds de Stabilisation des 
Recettes Budgétaires 
Congo  Unknown  Oil  Stabilization Fund  1.64  d  2010 
Fonds de Stabilisation des 
Recettes Budgétaires 
Equatorial Guinea  Unknown  Oil  Stabilization Fund  1.39  d  2010 
Fonds de Réserves pour 
Générations Futures 
Equatorial Guinea  Unknown  Oil 
Development fund  0.080  d  2010 




Oil  Development fund 
0.380  d  2010 
Minerals Development Fund  Ghana  1994  Gold and 
other 
minerals 
Development fund          24 
 
Libyan Investment Authority  Libya  2006
 a  Oil  Development fund  70 
h 
2010 
Fonds National des Revenus 
des Hydrocarbures 
Mauritania  2006
 a  Oil  Stabilization Fund  0.03425  j  2009 
Minerals Development Fund  Namibia  1995 k  Minerals  Development Fund  NA       
Excess Crude Fund (Account)  Nigeria  2004
 a  Oil and gas  Stabilization Fund  3  l  2010 
National Oil Account   São Tomé and 
Príncipe 
2004
 a  Oil  Development Fund  0.010  m  2009 
Oil Revenue Stabilization Fund 
Sudan  2002 n  Oil  Stabilization Fund 
0.15 
o  2009 
(a)  Monitor group 
(b)  Direction Générale de la prévision et des politiques, Ministry of Finance, Algeria 
(c)  Asfaha (2007) 
(d)  Banque des États de l'Afrique Centrale (2010) 
(e)  Sogge (2009) 
(f)  Norton Rose (2008) 
(g)  Bank of Botswana, http://www.bankofbotswana.bw/index.php/content/2009103013033-pula-fund 
(h)  Mercer (2010)  
(i)  Gabon holds since 1998 a reserve account at the level of the BEAC (Banque des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale) under the name of the Fund for Future 
generations. In 2010, this fund was renamed the Fonds Souverain de la Republique Gabonaise. According to BEAC report as of January 2010, the fund 
for future generation balance amounted to USD 0.380 billion 
(j)  Ministère des finances, direction générale du trésor et de la comptabilité publique, available at http://www.fr.for-mauritania.org/1373-0-Exclusif-For-
Mauritania-publie-des-documents-confidentiels-sur-le-pillage-du-Fond-National-des-Revenus-des-Hydrocrabures-par-la-Junte.html 
(k)  MDF website available at http://www.mme.gov.na/MDF/index.htm 
(l)  International Monetary Fund, July 2010, Nigeria: establishing a sovereign wealth fund. 
(m) Final report on assessment of public finance management in Sao Tome and Principe 2009, EC Multiple Framework Contract Beneficiaries, March 2010 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/economic-support/public finance/documents/sao_tome_e_principe_pefa_report_2010_en.pdf 
(n)  Truman (2008) 
       (o)Medani(2010)25 
 
A2: Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index  
The  Linaburg-Madue;;  Transparency  Index  is  based  on  ten  essential  principles  that  depict 
sovereign wealth fund transparency to the public. The following principles each add one point of 
transparency to the index rating. The index is an ongoing project of the Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Institute. The minimum rating a fund can receive is 1; however, the Sovereign Wealth Fund 
Institute  recommends  a  minimum  rating  of  8  in  order  to  claim  adequate  transparency. 
Transparency ratings may change as funds release additional information. There are different 
levels of depth in regards to each principle; judgment of these principles is left to the discretion 
of the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. 
 
Point  Principles of the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index 
+1  Fund provides history including reason for creation, origins of wealth, and government 
ownership structure 
+1  Fund provides up-to-date independently audited annual reports 
+1  Fund provides ownership percentage of company holdings, and geographic locations of 
holdings 
+1  Fund provides total portfolio market value, returns, and management compensation 
+1  Fund provides guidelines in reference to ethical standards, investment policies, and enforcer of 
guidelines 
+1  Fund provides clear strategies and objectives 
+1  If applicable, the fund clearly identifies subsidiaries and contact information 
+1  If applicable, the fund identifies external managers 
+1  Fund manages its own web site 
+1  Fund provides main office location address and contact information such as telephone and fax 
 26 
 
 A3: Subsidiaries of the Libyan Investment Authority 
 
 













United Air Transport, … 










Reserved funds: Oil 
Reserve Fund (ORF), 
(ESDF) 
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